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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant 
was not seized when Officer Knighton and her partner blocked 
Defendant's truck by parking nose-to-nose with the truck and then 
activated her "takedown lights" and high-beam lights upon Defendant's 
truck prior to questioning Defendant and the co-passengers of the 
truck. The trial court's ultimate determination of the level of stop 
is a legal conclusion that is afforded no deference on appeal and is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 & n.2 
(Utah App. 1994) (citing United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417 
(D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 880, 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990)). This 
issue was preserved by way of trial counsel's motion to suppress 
together with the evidence and argument presented at the suppression 
hearing (R. 45-63, Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 23-26, 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Officer 
Knighton had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had either committed 
a crime, was in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to 
commit a crime when Defendant merely parked his truck and no one at 
any time exited the truck prior to the seizure and investigative 
questioning. The "determination of whether a specific set of facts 
gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is 
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reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." State v. Pena, 8 69 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1272 (Utah 1993); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved by 
way of trial counsel's motion to suppress together with the evidence 
and argument presented at the suppression hearing (R. 45-63, 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 23-26, Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 13 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Information filed on March 7, 1995, and amended on 
April 4, 1995, Defendant was charged with (1) Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i); (2) Driving While Under the Influence 
of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; (3) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. On 
April 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed counsel for 
Arraignment before the district court and pleaded not guilty. 
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Thereafter, on May 19, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed 
counsel for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, after which 
the district court took the matter under advisement. On June 6, 
1995, the district court, by way of its Ruling on Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. At the Pretrial 
Conference on September 12, 1995, Defendant entered a conditional 
plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance with the other 
two counts being dismissed. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 
11, 1995. By way of Memorandum Decision, filed December 29, 1995, 
this Court summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
due to the lack of a final judgment. Pursuant to the Stipulation on 
the conditional plea of guilty, filed on April 23, 1996, the district 
court, signed the Judgment on May 23, 1996, which was entered on May 
24, 1996, sentencing, inter alia, Defendant to an indeterminate term 
of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, which was stayed 
pending determination of Defendant's appeal. Defendant filed Notice 
of Appeal on June 24, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 3, 1995, at approximately 9:58 p.m., Officer 
Eileen Knighton, a Deputy Paramedic with the Davis County Sheriff's 
Office (R. 47, Transcript of Suppression Hearing), was patrolling 
westbound on Center Street in North Salt Lake (R. 8-11, Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing); 
2. In the course of patrolling, Officer Knighton observed 
Defendant's truck traveling westbound on Center Street "half a mile 
6 
or so" ahead of Deputy Knighton's patrol vehicle (R. 48, lines 13-14, 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing); 
3. The area being patrolled by Officer Knighton was an open 
field area with some construction taking place on a bridge where 
Center Street and the Jordan River intersect (R. 47-48, Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing)/ 
4. As Defendant's truck approached the construction area, 
Officer Knighton "became curious to know where they were going down 
there" (R. 48, lines 13-17, Transcript of Suppression Hearing); 
5. Officer Knighton observed Defendant's truck turn and back 
up towards the barricades or signs surrounding the construction area 
so that the truck faced east (R. 48, lines 17-19, R. 51, lines 21-22, 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing), after which Defendant stopped the 
truck and turned off the headlights (R. 48, lines 17-18, Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing). The construction vehicles and supplies 
located in the construction area were located approximately two 
hundred feet away from the area where Defendant stopped his truck (R. 
51, lines 1-13, Transcript of Suppression Hearing); 
6. At no time during the events in question did Defendant or 
any of his co-passengers ever exit Defendant's truck and go towards 
the construction area (R. 52, lines 14-19, Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing); 
7. Officer Knighton and her partner proceeded to Defendant's 
location "to determine why the individual had stopped there" (R. 48, 
lines 22-23, Transcript of Suppression Hearing). As they proceeded, 
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Officer Knighton had a "suspicion" of criminal activity (R. 51-52, 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing), which, according to Officer 
Knighton's testimony, was based on the construction equipment located 
in the general vicinity, the lateness of the hour, i.e., 9:58 p.m., 
and that criminal activity often occurs in that area (R. 54, 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing); 
8. In the course of proceeding to Defendant's location, 
Officer Knighton turned off all of the lights on the patrol vehicle 
(R. 48-49, Transcript of Suppression Hearing). Officer Knighton then 
approached Defendant's truck until her patrol vehicle was "nose to 
nose" with Defendant's truck, at which time she then activated her 
high-beam headlights and clear white "takedown lights" located in the 
light bar on top of the patrol vehicle (R. 49, lines 5-17, Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing);' 
9. Upon activating her high-beam headlights and "takedown 
lights," to illuminate Defendant's area, Officer Knighton observed 
three individuals in the truck - two males and a female - who looked 
up towards the patrol vehicle (R. 49-50, Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing), at which time Officer Knighton stated that she "felt some 
movement, some secretive movement" (R. 49-50, Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing). Officer Knighton's vehicle was a marked patrol 
vehicle with law enforcement decals on the doors and the light bar on 
the top of the vehicle (R. 53, lines 3-7, Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing). In addition to the clear white "takedown lights," the 
light bar on the top of the patrol vehicle had the traditional red 
8 
and blue lights in addition to grill lights in the front grill of the 
patrol vehicle (R. 53-54, Transcript of Suppression Hearing); 
10. Officer Knighton then approached the vehicle and conducted 
an "investigation," which resulted in the discovery of a controlled 
substance that served as the basis for Defendant's conviction; 
11. By way of Information filed on March 7, 1995, and amended 
on April 4, 1995, Defendant was charged with (1) Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); (2) Driving While Under the Influence 
of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5; (3) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (R. 
17-18, Amended Information); 
12. On April 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed 
counsel for Arraignment before the district court and pleaded not 
guilty (R. 19, Minute Entry); 
13. Defendant subsequently appeared with appointed counsel on 
May 19, 1995, for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, after 
which the district court took the matter under advisement (R. 61, 
lines 21-22, Transcript of Suppression Hearing; R. 22, Minute Entry); 
14. On June 6, 1995, the district court, by way of its Ruling 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, denied Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress (R. 23-26, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). In 
its Ruling, the district court concluded that no detention occurred 
at the moment Officer Knighton activated her high-beam and "takedown" 
9 
lights (R. 24, Rule on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). The district 
court further concluded that, assuming arguendo that a detention did 
occur, "Deputy Knighton had reasonable suspicion, based on 
articulable facts, that Defendant had either committed a crime, was 
in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to commit a 
crime" (R. 24-25, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress); 
15. At the Pretrial Conference on September 12, 1995, Defendant 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with the other two counts being dismissed (R. 87, lines 2-
9, and R. 93, lines 5-7, Transcript of Pretrial Conference); 
16. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 11, 1995 (R. 35-37, 
Notice of Appeal); 
17. By way of Memorandum Decision, filed December 29, 1995, the 
Utah Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction due to the lack of a final judgment (R. 84 and 98, 
Memorandum Decision); 
18. Pursuant to Stipulation on the conditional plea of guilty, 
filed on April 23, 1996 (R. 104, Stipulation on Plea), the district 
court, signed the Judgment on May 23, 1996, which was entered on May 
24, 1996, sentencing Defendant, inter alia, to an indeterminate term 
of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, which was stayed 
pending determination of Defendant's appeal (R. 105-06, Judgment); 
19. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on June 24, 1996 (R. 107-
09, Notice of Appeal). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in determining that Defendant was not 
seized when Officer Knighton, with her partner, parked the patrol 
vehicle nose-to-nose with Defendant's truck, thereby blocking 
Defendant's truck, and then activated both the "takedown lights" and 
high beam headlights of the patrol vehicle prior to continuing 
investigation of Defendant and his co-passengers. In the course of 
its Fourth Amendment analysis, the trial court erred in its analysis 
of the level of stop by utilizing an inquiry that is too narrow and 
thereby failing to consider the totality of the circumstances. Based 
on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's liberty was 
restrained and a seizure occurred at the point Officer Knighton and 
her partner covertly approached and parked the marked patrol vehicle 
nose-to-nose to Defendant's truck and turned on both her high-beam 
headlights and "takedown lights" to illuminate Defendant's truck. By 
so doing, Officer Knighton effectively blocked Defendant's truck and 
then utilized a show of authority to detain Defendant for the purpose 
of continuing the investigation of Defendant. 
2. The trial court erred by concluding that Officer Knighton 
had a reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant committed or was 
about to commit a crime prior to seizing Defendant when Defendant 
merely parked his truck and no one exited the truck at any time prior 
to the seizure and investigative questioning by Officer Knighton. 
Notwithstanding Officer Knighton's testimony that the situation was 
suspicious, neither she nor her partner could point to specific 
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objective facts to support her hunch or suspicion. Rather, Officer 
Knighton was merely "curious" about where Defendant was going. 
Because Officer Knighton did not articulate reasonable objective 
facts for suspecting Struhs had engaged in or was about to engage in 
criminal conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime 
prevention and constitutional right of Struhs to personal security 
and privacy tilts in favor of Struhs to protect Struhs from the 
unreasonable police interference. The seizure by Office Knighton of 
Struhs was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure should be 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT SEIZED WHEN OFFICER KNIGHTON, ALONG WITH HER 
PARTNER, PARKED THE PATROL VEHICLE NOSE-TO-NOSE WITH 
DEFENDANT'S TRUCK, THEREBY BLOCKING THE TRUCK, AND 
THEN ACTIVATED BOTH THE "TAKEDOWN LIGHTS" AND HIGH-
BEAM HEADLIGHTS OF THE PATROL VEHICLE PRIOR TO THE 
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT. 
Because a Fourth Amendment1 analysis of police officer conduct 
is fact sensitive, the facts are reviewed in detail. State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988). A trial court's determination of the 
level of stop is a legal conclusion that is afforded no deference on 
appeal and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 
xThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." 
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985 & n.2 (Utah App. 1994) (citing United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 
415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 880, 111 S.Ct. 214 
(1990)); see also State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that people have the right to be secure in their persons and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, the Fourth 
Amendment functions to "prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference 
by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of 
individuals." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 
S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) (citations omitted). 
The search and seizures limitations of the Fourth Amendment 
apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that fall short of 
official arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 
(1968). "A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs 
only when the officer by means of physical force or show of authority 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a person." State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. At 1876 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16, 
88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16)). "When a reasonable person, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believes 
he is not free to leave a seizure occurs." Id. (citing Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877). 
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In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), the 
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged three levels of police encounters 
with the public that are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
Id. at 616-17 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 
(5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied sub nom. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 
(1986)) . Because the above-mentioned demarcations are often 
difficult to apply, the appellate court "must not only balance the 
competing interests of the individual and the State but also 
carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah App. 1990). Further, 
characterization of the encounter between an officer and a defendant 
must be determined by examining the "totality of the circumstances." 
See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989). 
A level one stop "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." 
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); accord Carter, 812 P.2d at 463. These 
consensual and voluntary discussions between citizens and police 
14 
officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protection. 
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994); Jackson, 805 P.2d 
at 768. 
In contrast to a level one stop, a level two stop, or a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer 
"*by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way 
restrained the liberty'" of a person. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552, 
100 S.Ct. at 1876 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 
1899 n.16); accord Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87. "The test for when the 
seizure occurred is objective and depends on when the person 
reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks the 
person is no longer free to leave." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
786 (Utah 1991); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 
1877; Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767. 
In State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989), this Court 
held that a seizure had occurred when the officer followed Smith into 
a parking lot and blocked Smith's car after Smith had made a turn 
without signaling. The totality of the circumstances underlying the 
Court's determination that Smith's liberty had been restrained and 
that a seizure had occurred were that the officer initiated the stop 
with either his overhead lights or spot light and blocked Smith's 
car, got out the marked police car to talk to Smith late at night, 
asked for Smith's license and registration, issued Smith a traffic 
citation, and required Smith to remain while he did a warrants check 
and called for a backup officer. Id. at 882. In Smith, the Court 
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noted that other jurisdictions have held that when an officer blocks 
a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs "even though the original stop was not initiated by 
the officer." Id at 882 n.3; see People v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435, 440 
(1982) (holding that although the initial stop of defendant's vehicle 
in a driveway was not the result of the officer's actions, his 
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to defendant's 
car clearly constituted a detention of the automobile and would be 
the equivalent of a police-initiated "stop"); United States v. Kerr, 
817 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that seizure occurred 
because it was not possible for defendant to drive around the 
officer's car and defendant stopped and exited his car primarily in 
response to the police officer's official appearance and conduct 
rather than of this own volition). 
The trial court, in the instant case, concluded that the 
encounter between Officer Knighton and Struhs was. a level one 
encounter. See R. 24, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. In 
the course of so concluding, the trial court focused upon whether or 
not the use of the * takedown lights" as opposed to the other red and 
blue lights on the patrol vehicle light bar constituted a detention 
subject to Fourth Amendment protection.2 Id. The trial court erred 
2In the course of focusing on the "takedown lights" issue, the 
trial court based its determination on the underlying facts or lack 
thereof pertaining to the use of overhead lights by the officer in 
State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) . Davis, however, is 
distinguishable from the instant case because the police officer in 
Davis had not been detained, even momentarily, and "could have 
reasonably believed that he was free to drive away as the officer 
16 
in its analysis of the level of stop by utilizing an inquiry that is 
too narrow and thereby failing to consider the totality of the 
circumstances. See Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. While the utilization by 
Officer Knighton of her *takedown lights" as opposed to the other 
lights on the light bar of the patrol vehicle is relevant, it is not 
dispositive. Another consideration is whether Defendant "remain[ed], 
not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, 
but because he believe [ed] he [was] not free to leave. . . ." 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (emphasis added). 
The instant case is not a case where the police officer pulls 
along side a defendant's car without the use of lights or sirens and 
merely asks for identification or explanation. See Bountiful City v. 
Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990). Moreover, this is not a 
case where the defendant, prior to having his vehicle blocked by the 
officer's patrol vehicle, exited his car and approached the officer 
of his own volition. See Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767-68. 
Based on a review of the totality of the circumstances, 
Defendant's liberty was restrained and a seizure occurred at the 
point Officer Knighton and her partner covertly approached and parked 
the marked patrol vehicle nose-to-nose to Defendant's truck and 
pulled up in his vehicle." Id. at 12. Further, unlike the instant 
case, the police officer in Davis, as he pulled behind the 
defendant's car, observed a can of beer on the trunk of the car, an 
open passenger door, and a man urinating, which created a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that a crime had been committed. 
Id. Finally, in contrast to the case at bar, nothing in the record 
in Davis suggested that formal investigation into possible criminal 
wrongdoing had begun when the officer first arrived. Id. 
17 
turned both her high-beam headlights and "takedown lights" on 
Defendant's truck. By so doing, Officer Knighton effectively blocked 
Defendant's truck and then utilized a show of authority to detain 
Defendant for the purpose of continuing the investigation of 
Defendant. 
2. BECAUSE DEFENDANT MERELY PARKED HIS TRUCK AND NO ONE 
EXITED THE TRUCK AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SEIZURE AND 
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING BY OFFICER KNIGHTON, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT OFFICER KNIGHTON 
HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED OR 
WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME. 
In order to justify a seizure, like that in the instant case, 
the police officer must "point to specific, articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead 
a reasonable person to conclude Struhs had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 
(1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); 
and State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984)). 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968), 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
And in making that assessment it is imperative 
that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution 
in the belief" that the action taken was 
appropriate? Anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed 
rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has 
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consistently refused to sanction. And simple 
"*good faith on the part of the arresting 
officer is not enough'. . . ." 
Id. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80 (citations omitted). 
Utah codified this constitutionally mandated "reasonable 
suspicion" at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, which states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand a name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
According to § 77-7-15, a "brief investigatory stop of an individual 
by police officers is permissible when the officers *have a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual 
is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 
675 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 
1985)); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984). 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), a 
police officer, who was patrolling a neighborhood in which a number 
of burglaries had recently occurred, observed, at 3:00 a.m., a slowly 
moving vehicle with Arizona plates. Id. at 675. The officer did not 
observe a traffic offense and had no report of a recent burglary. 
Id. The vehicle pulled into a driveway of a house where one of the 
occupants resided. Id. Because there were no objective facts on 
which to base a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car 
were involved in criminal activity, the Utah Supreme Court held the 
investigatory stop unconstitutional. Id. 
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As in Carpena, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Swanigan, 699 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1985 (per curiam), held the stop unconstitutional. 
Id. at 719. In that case, the police officer, at approximately 1:40 
a.m., stopped two persons walking down a street. Id. The seizure 
was based on a description by a fellow police officer who had 
observed the two individuals walking along the street at a late hour 
in an area where a recent burglary had been reported. Id. In that 
case, the officer saw them neither at the scene of the crime nor did 
he see them engage in any criminal activity. Id. 
Applying the aforementioned principles of law and authority, the 
totality of the circumstances preceding the seizure of Struhs does 
not support a reasonable suspicion that Struhs was involved in 
criminal conduct. Officer Knighton did not, at any time prior to the 
seizure, observe Defendant or his co-passengers engage in any type of 
criminal conduct. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979); 
Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675; Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719. Rather the 
initial decision to seize Struhs was based merely on the lateness of 
the hour, the construction zone in the area, and the alleged high-
crime factor in the area. Cf. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89. There is 
nothing in the record indicating that it was unusual for people to be 
driving and parking in the manner that Officer Knighton observed on 
the night in question. 
Notwithstanding Officer Knighton's testimony that the situation 
was suspicious, neither she nor her partner could point to specific 
objective facts to support her hunch or suspicion. Rather, Officer 
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Knighton was merely "curious" about where Defendant was going. In 
short, there is nothing distinguishing Struhs' activity from that of 
any other citizen driving in the area, especially since Struhs did 
not exit the vehicle when it came to a stop and since the 
construction area was approximately two hundred yards away. 
Because Officer Knighton did not articulate reasonable objective 
facts for suspecting Struhs had engaged in or was about to engage in 
criminal conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime 
prevention and constitutional right of Struhs to personal security 
and privacy tilts in favor of Struhs to protect Struhs from the 
unreasonable police interference. The seizure by Office Knighton of 
Struhs was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
and the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure should be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's opinion so that Defendant's constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures might be effectuated. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which are matters of 
continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hit) day of December, 1996. 
iLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
Sbotfe^L Mjgpins 
At torneys for Appel lan t 
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